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Blockchain is being considered, and in some cases used, for foodborne
illness origin identification.1 In September 2018, Walmart and Sam’s Club
announced that they would require their suppliers to begin using an IBM
blockchain platform to allow for greater transparency and traceability in the
production of leafy green vegetables in the event of an Escherichia Coli (E.
coli) outbreak.2 The companies’ efforts were further highlighted in the midst
of an extensive romaine lettuce based E. coli outbreak that lasted from De-
cember 2018 to January 2019.3 This was the second time in 2018 that there
was a foodborne illness outbreak related to romaine lettuce.4 Sixty-two peo-
ple from sixteen different states and the District of Columbia were reported
as being infected by the strain of E. coli at issue, and the outbreak did not
officially end until January 9, 2019.5 When investigating the outbreak, the
United States Food and Drug Administration (FDA) advised the public to
stop eating lettuce completely because there was no way to quickly and accu-
rately identify the source of contamination.6
Being able to identify the source of contamination in a foodborne illness
outbreak is not only an important issue for public safety but also essential in
* Morgan Crider is a 2020 candidate for Juris Doctor from SMU Dedman School
of Law. She received a Bachelor of Agricultural Communications and Journal-
ism from Texas A&M University in 2017.
1. See Kate Rooney, Walmart is Going to Use Blockchain to Stop the Spread of E.
Coli and Other Diseases in Lettuce, CNBC (Sept. 25, 2018), https://
www.cnbc.com/2018/09/24/walmart-is-going-to-use-blockchain-to-stop-the-
spread-of-e-coli-in-lettuce.html; cf. From Shore to Plate: Tracking Tuna on the
Blockchain, PROVENANCE (July 15, 2016), https://www.provenance.org/track
ing-tuna-on-the-blockchain (outlining a blockchain system used for tuna fish-
ing in Indonesia that allows consumers to see the fair labor and sustainability
aspects of fish they buy).
2. See Rooney, supra note 1.
3. See Outbreak of E. Coli Infections Linked to Romaine Lettuce, CTRS. FOR DIS-
EASE CONTROL & PREVENTION (Jan. 9, 2019), https://www.cdc.gov/ecoli/2018/
o157h7-11-18/index.html.
4. See Maggie Fox, The FDA thinks Walmart May Have One Solution to Romaine
Lettuce Recalls, CNBC (Nov. 27, 2018), https://www.nbcnews.com/health/
health-news/fda-thinks-walmart-may-have-one-solution-romaine-lettuce-recalls
-n940826.
5. See Outbreak of E. Coli Infections Linked to Romaine Lettuce, supra note 3.
6. See Fox, supra note 4.
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enabling people to have a legal remedy for the damages incurred.7 To suc-
ceed on a defective food product liability claim, it is imperative for a plaintiff
to know the source of the contaminant so as to identify the proper defendant.8
Product liability laws vary by state in that not all states permit plaintiffs to
bring forth a claim with multiple defendants based on the likelihood that one
or several of the named defendants was the source of contamination.9
Blockchain technology is essentially an electronic ledger that provides a
detailed history of previous interactions between collaborating parties, and
such a ledger cannot be easily altered.10 Through the use of blockchain, com-
panies are able to see the chain of custody for a food product and are capable
of accounting for any product issues that may have occurred earlier on.11
Blockchain provides an effective and efficient way to achieve data and trans-
action transparency.12 This Comment will focus on the use of blockchain
technology in the agriculture industry and how the use of a verifiable
blockchain platforms would resolve judicial ambiguity in food product liabil-
ity litigation.
II. THE CHALLENGE OF FOODBORNE ILLNESS
INVESTIGATIONS AND LITIGATION
When addressing a foodborne illness outbreak, the focus is on safety
and regulatory solutions.13 The law generally defaults to looking at the place
of origin as the source of liability, but by implementing blockchain technol-
ogy into food production, there would be greater transparency about the
chain of ownership which would promote a broader and a more informed
approach to agricultural product liability.14
7. Angela Holt, Alternative Liability Theory: Solving the Mystery of Who Dunnit
in Foodborne Illness Cases, 2 PITT. J. ENVTL. & PUB. HEALTH L. 105, 108
(2008).
8. See id.
9. See id. at 116.
10. See Maryanne Murray, Blockchain Explained, REUTERS GRAPHICS (June 15,
2018), http://graphics.reuters.com/TECHNOLOGY-BLOCKCHAIN/
010070P11GN/index.html.
11. See Blockchain: The Solution for Transparency in Product Supply Chains,
PROVENANCE (Nov. 21, 2015), https://www.provenance.org/whitepaper.
12. See id.
13. See Alexia Brunet Marks, Check Please: Using Legal Liability to Inform Food
Safety Regulation, 50 HOUS. L. REV. 723, 724 (2013).
14. See id. at 725; Blockchain: The Solution for Transparency in Product Supply
Chains, supra note 11.
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A. The Origination and Investigation of Foodborne Illnesses
A foodborne illness is generally an infection caused by bacteria, viruses,
or parasites carried by contaminated foods.15 Food may be contaminated at
any point during growing, harvesting, processing, storage, and shipping.16
Further contamination may take place during the preparation process if han-
dlers do not wash their hands, utensils, or kitchen surfaces after coming into
contact with raw foods, which will likely lead to cross contamination.17 In the
United States, the top five germs that cause foodborne illnesses are: (1)
Norovirus; (2) Salmonella; (3) Clostridium perfringens; (4) Campylobacter;
and (5) Staphylococcus aureus.18 Raw foods such as meat, poultry, fish, and
fresh produce frequently contain bacteria that cause foodborne illnesses.19
A patient with a foodborne illness typically presents gastrointestinal or
neurologic symptoms.20 Healthcare providers must consider the symptoms of
the patient, foods and beverages recently consumed by the patient, and the
medical history of the patient.21 Identifying the source of the foodborne ill-
ness can be challenging because there is typically a viral incubation period.22
Illness causing pathogens can have an incubation period of several days
before symptoms appear.23 Therefore, by the time the symptoms do appear, it
is much harder for the patient to identify the source of his illness.24 Further,
an outbreak may begin with a patient who is not severely ill, therefore physi-
cians have to approach claims of gastrointestinal distress with careful suspi-
cion.25 If the physician believes that a foodborne illness is the cause of the
symptoms, then the physician must submit the appropriate samples from the
patient for laboratory testing.26 Subsequently, the physician must formally
report to the state or local health department regarding the possible out-
15. See Food Safety, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, https://
www.cdc.gov/foodsafety/foodborne-germs.html (last updated Feb. 16, 2018).
16. See Symptoms & Causes of Food Poisoning, NAT’L INST. OF DIABETES & DI-
GESTIVE & KIDNEY DISEASES (June 2019), https://www.niddk.nih.gov/health-
information/digestive-diseases/food-poisoning/symptoms-causes#causes.
17. See id.
18. See Food Safety, supra note 15.
19. See Symptoms & Causes of Food Poisoning, supra note 16.
20. See Diagnosis and Management of Foodborne Illnesses, CTRS. FOR DISEASE




23. See Holt, supra note 7, at 108.
24. See id.
25. See Diagnosis and Management of Foodborne Illnesses, supra note 20.
26. See id.
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break.27 The possibility of foodborne illnesses may also be detected through
public health surveillance, where health officials gather reports of illnesses to
determine if there is a large number of people in one location in a given
period of time being diagnosed with the same illness.28 Private citizens may
also call the local health department to report a possible foodborne illness
outbreak.29 In addition, for certain pathogens such as E. coli, state laborato-
ries will report the unique DNA identifier of the strand to the PulseNet
database.30 PulseNet is a national laboratory network that connects foodborne
illness cases to detect outbreaks.31 PulseNet’s database allows public health
officials investigating outbreaks to quickly identify if a recently reported
pathogen matches the DNA strand of a specific strain of pathogen in the
database.32 If an investigation indicates that a large number of infected peo-
ple have significant similarities in their diagnosis, the illnesses are then clas-
sified as an outbreak.33
After a foodborne disease outbreak is detected, public health and regula-
tory officials work to collect information rapidly in order to find out which
pathogen is causing the outbreak and where the contamination originated.34
In an investigation, there are three types of data collected: (1) epidemiologic;
(2) traceback; and (3) environmental testing.35 Epidemiologic data is the
“patterns in the geographic distribution of illnesses, the time periods when
people got sick and past outbreaks involving the same germ.”36 Traceback
data is the information obtained from stores and restaurants to determine the
point of contamination in the food processing chain.37 Lastly, food and envi-
ronmental testing data is the DNA data linking illness-causing germs found
in a food item obtained from a diagnosed patient’s home or food production
location and germs found in other environments that resulted in people be-
27. See id; see also Foodborne Outbreaks—Step 1: Detect a Possible Outbreak,
CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, https://www.cdc.gov/foodsafety/
outbreaks/investigating-outbreaks/investigations/detection.html (last updated
June 20, 2018).






34. Investigating Outbreaks, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, https://
www.cdc.gov/foodsafety/outbreaks/investigating-outbreaks/index.html (last
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coming sick.38 However, even with all of this data, health officials are not
able to solve every outbreak, either because of the ambiguity in tracing or
because the outbreak ends before enough information can be gathered.39
With these three types of data, the health officials will develop hypothe-
ses about the origination of the outbreak.40 During this process, health offi-
cials will conduct interviews with diagnosed patients to determine what and
where they ate and how long before they began exhibiting symptoms.41
Health officials will combine the three different sets of data with the infor-
mation obtained from the interviews to determine the source of food contam-
ination.42However, due to the incubation period of certain viruses, the
reliance on patient memory and personal knowledge can be challenging, be-
cause the patient may not remember what they ate several weeks ago and
may not be able to identify what ingredient was contaminated.43
To determine the validity of the developed hypotheses, health officials
will compare the statistical information regarding sick patients against indi-
viduals who had similar exposure to a contaminated food.44 Health officials
will determine the strength of the association with respect to a specific food
item that was reported more often by sick patients than individuals who were
in good health.45 Pivotal factors in interpreting the results of the data with the
hypotheses are the amount of exposure to the particular food, “the strength of
the statistical association,” and “[t]he food’s production, distribution, prepa-
ration, and service.”46
Food testing also takes place to identify the DNA of the bacteria in food
products matching the original contaminant.47 Identifying bacteria with
matching DNA is an additional form of data used to confirm the hypotheses
concerning the source of contamination.48 However, food testing is not al-
38. See id.
39. See id.
40. See Foodborne Outbreaks—Step 3: Generate Hypotheses about Likely Sources,






44. See Foodborne Outbreaks—Step 4: Test Hypotheses, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CON-
TROL & PREVENTION (last revised June 20, 2018), https://www.cdc.gov/food
safety/outbreaks/investigating-outbreaks/investigations/hypotheses.html (last
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ways dependable, especially when the particular food has a short shelf-life,
has become spoiled, is in an open container, or if there is no accurate test for
the specific pathogen.49
Once an outbreak is determined, public health officials act swiftly to
disinfect the food facilities, temporarily close the location of contamination,
inform the public how to make the food safe or to not eat the food item, and
tell people to throw away any suspect food remaining in their homes.50 The
Center for Disease Control (CDC) will likely warn the public of the current
risk when the investigation identifies the food item linked to the series of
illnesses.51 However, there are instances where the hypotheses fail to link
food to an illness or any specific food.52 Such failures may be on account of a
number of reasons, including: (1) the investigation taking place too long after
the outbreak; (2) no specific hypothesis being formed; (3) too few illnesses
being available to study; (4) patients not remembering the food they ate; (5)
food testing either not being done or not revealing a pathogen; or (6) not
enough resources being available to conduct the investigation.53
In 2018, the CDC estimated that each year “48 million get sick from a
foodborne illness, 128,000 are hospitalized, and 3,000 die.”54 In 2011, the
Grocery Manufacturers Association surveyed three dozen international com-
panies, more than half of which reported being impacted by a food recall at
least once in the past five years.55 Of those surveyed, the reported financial
impact as result of food recalls ranged from $30 to $100 million, but the
heftiest cost was the reputational damage done to the companies.56 In light of
all of the ambiguities and difficulties caused by each step of the investiga-
tion, there is a considerable need for the aid of technological advancement to
provide efficiency and reliability.
49. See id.
50. See Foodborne Outbreaks—Step 6: Control an Outbreak, CTRS. FOR DISEASE
CONTROL & PREVENTION, https://www.cdc.gov/foodsafety/outbreaks/investigat
ing-outbreaks/investigations/control.html (last updated June 20, 2018).
51. See id.
52. See Foodborne Outbreaks—Step 5: Solve Point of Contamination and Source
of the Food, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, https://www.
cdc.gov/foodsafety/outbreaks/investigating-outbreaks/investigations/contami-
nation.html (last updated June 20, 2018).
53. See id.
54. Foodborne Illnesses and Germs, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION,
https://www.cdc.gov/foodsafety/foodborne-germs.html (last updated Feb. 16,
2018).
55. Beth Kowitt, Why Our Food Keeps Making Us Sick, FORTUNE (May 6, 2016),
http://fortune.com/food-contamination.
56. See id.
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B. Meeting the Burden of Proof in Product Liability
Food safety laws exist at all levels of government with their own regu-
lating agencies.57 At the federal level, the FDA, Food Safety and Inspection
Service (FSIS), and CDC are responsible for regulating and enforcing federal
food safety rules.58 The FDA’s regulatory jurisdiction encompasses safety
standards over a wide range of products found in food.59 Specifically, the
FDA is responsible for ensuring the safety and security of the nation’s food
supply.60 FSIS is an agency within the United States Department of Agricul-
ture (USDA) responsible for ensuring the safety of meat, poultry, and
processed egg products by reviewing the labeling for accuracy and enforcing
federal food safety standards on specific food items,61 while the role of the
CDC is to detect and respond to emerging health threats, such as foodborne
illness outbreaks.62 The CDC also helps state and local health departments
conduct efficient foodborne disease surveillance and outbreak response.63
The controlling agencies vary at the state level.64 For example, in Texas, the
Texas State Department of State Health Services regulates food safety.65
Foodborne illness litigation is based on products liability law.66 The le-
gal theory of product liability concerns the liability of parties along the chain
of product manufacturing that has caused damage to a party.67 Manufacturers
are typically held strictly liable for harm to a person induced by “any product
57. See Marks, supra note 13, at 726.
58. See About Foodsafety.gov, FOODSAFETY.GOV, https://www.foodsafety.gov/
about/federal/index.html (last visited Jan. 28, 2019).
59. See Food Safety—An Overview, NAT’L AGRIC. LAW CTR., https://nation-
alaglawcenter.org/overview/food-safety/ (last visited Feb. 17, 2020).
60. See What We Do, FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., https://www.fda.gov/AboutFDA/
WhatWeDo/ (last updated Mar. 28, 2018).
61. See Inspection for Food Safety: The Basics, FOOD SAFETY & INSPECTION
SERV., https://www.fsis.usda.gov/wps/portal/fsis/topics/food-safety-education/
get-answers/food-safety-fact-sheets/production-and-inspection/inspection-for-
food-safety-the-basics/inspection-for-food-safety-basics (last updated Aug. 9,
2013).
62. See CDC Regulations, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION https://
www.cdc.gov/regulations/index.html (last updated June 30, 2016).
63. See About Foodsafety.gov, supra note 58.
64. See id.
65. See Food Manufacturers, Wholesalers, and Warehouses, TEX. DEP’T STATE
HEALTH SERVS., https://www.dshs.texas.gov/foods/default.aspx (last updated
Jan. 14, 2019).
66. See Holt, supra note 7, at 108.
67. See Products Liability, CORNELL L. SCHOOL: LEGAL INFO. INST., https://
www.law.cornell.edu/wex/products_liability (last visited Jan. 12, 2020)
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in a defective condition unreasonably dangerous to the user.”68 An “unrea-
sonably dangerous product” is one that was dangerous in a way that could
not be contemplated by an ordinary consumer “with the ordinary knowledge
common to the community as to its characteristics.”69 In the Restatement
(Third) of Torts, defective food product liability qualifies “a harm-causing
ingredient” as defective “if a reasonable consumer would not expect the food
product to contain that ingredient.”70 To succeed on a claim of defective food
product, a plaintiff must show that the product was defective at the time of
distribution and that he suffered harm as a result of the defectiveness.71 Gen-
erally, the three product liability theories impacting foodborne illness litiga-
tion are: (1) manufacturing defect; (2) design defect; and (3) failure to
provide adequate warning instructions.72
Under the manufacturing defect theory, a product’s design is considered
safe but the actual product was flawed because it was faultily made,73 likely
due to a lack of quality control.74 The legitimacy of a manufacturing defect
claim comes from the difference between the defective product and other
products resulting from the same design.75 Design defect product liability is
based on the concept that the product is aligned with the intentional design of
the manufacturer, but the product still presents an unreasonable risk of dan-
ger to the consumer.76 In contrast, failure to provide adequate warning in-
structions is based on the assumption that had the consumer received
adequate warning of the danger, the consumer would have acted on such
warning.77 Therefore, the failure to warn is the proximate cause of a con-
sumer’s injuries.78 However, each state has its own interpretation of this the-
ory.79 There are no federal food product liability laws, so each state has
68. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (AM. LAW INST. 1965).
69. Id. § 402A cmt. i (1965).
70. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PROD. LIAB. § 7 (AM. LAW INST. 1998).
71. Id. § 7 cmt. (a)–(b) (1998).
72. See Liability for Foodborne Illness & Injury, PUB. HEALTH LAW CTR., https://
www.publichealthlawcenter.org/resources/liability-foodborne-illness-and-in
jury (last visited Feb. 17, 2020).
73. AMERICAN LAW OF PRODUCTS LIABILITY 3D § 31:5 (Richard E. Kaye rev. ed.
2019).
74. Id. § 31:2.
75. Id. § 31:5.
76. See id.
77. 8 AM. JUR. 3D Proof of Facts § 547 (1990).
78. See id.
79. See id. (contrasting Ohio caselaw which follows the presumption of adequate
warning versus Texas caselaw, which does not apply the presumption that con-
sumers would heed an adequate warning).
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adopted its own statutory standards of what legal elements must be satisfied
for a plaintiff to prevail and whether product liability is even considered a
strict liability.80
To prove a prima facie case of negligence in non-strict liability states, a
plaintiff must establish: (1) actual damages; (2) the existence of a legal duty
to exercise reasonable care; (3) a breach of said duty; (4) that the breach was
the cause in fact of the harm suffered by the plaintiff; and (5) that the harm
was within the scope of liability.81 The key issue in such cases is a question
of identification, no matter the state’s rules on product liability claims.82
Under a strict liability approach, the plaintiff must show that the defendant’s
food product was in defective condition at the time of purchase and that the
defect caused the plaintiff’s illness.83
Foodborne illness litigation presents challenges in that the plaintiff must
show that the illness resulted from a specific food item, which is more feasi-
ble if the plaintiff believes he contracted the infection from contaminated
food identified in an illness related outbreak.84 In such cases, the plaintiff will
notify her doctor of her suspicions and be tested to show that the DNA of the
infecting pathogen matches that of the strain linked to the outbreak.85 How-
ever, the plaintiff runs into an issue if the doctor she consulted with did not
order the correct diagnostic tests or if the pathogen had not fully incubated at
the time of the test.86 Confirmation that the plaintiff’s pathogen is from the
same strand as an outbreak is important, because identifying the source of
contamination is vital to a defective food product strict liability lawsuit.87
In terms of a strict liability defective food product lawsuit, the most
challenging aspects are identifying the food item which caused the harm,
proving the food carried the pathogen, and locating the point in the produc-
80. See Liability for Foodborne Illness & Injury, supra note 72 (explaining Minne-
sota requires plaintiffs to show a product was in defective condition different
from its intended use, defective at time of purchase, and was the proximate
cause of injury); see also American Tobacco Co., Inc. v. Grinnel, 951 S.W.2d
420, 434 (Tex. 1997) (reasoning that for a plaintiff in Texas to prevail on a
manufacturing defect claim, the product at issue must have deviated from its
planned specifications in addition to showing defect and injury).
81. See Marks, supra note 13, at 757.
82. Determining Legal Responsibility for Foodborne Illness & Injury, PUB.
HEALTH L. CTR., http://publichealthlawcenter.org/sites/default/files/resources/
phlc-fs-Det-Legal-Resp-Foodborne-Illness-2016.pdf (last updated Oct. 2016).
83. See id.
84. See id.
85. See id.; see also Step 1: Detect a Possible Outbreak, supra note 27.
86. See Determining Legal Responsibility for Foodborne Illness & Injury, supra
note 82.
87. See id.
272 SMU Science and Technology Law Review [Vol. XXII
tion process where the food was contaminated.88 Most food products go
through a chain of multiple processors before reaching an individual, which
not only allows multiple opportunities for the food to become contaminated,
but also makes it challenging for plaintiffs to identify the source of contami-
nation.89 In such cases, plaintiffs may bring suit against several parties who
are potentially responsible for the contamination, but the plaintiff then faces
an issue of credibility with respect to convincing the jury of the sufficiency
of evidence against the defendants in the case.90 Because of the considerable
difficulty for a plaintiff to identify the proper tortfeasor and then prevail in a
lawsuit, there is little to incentivize food manufacturers to monitor the quality
of products along the chain of production.91
There is also an issue of allocating damages in foodborne illness law-
suits.92 For example, under the joint and several liability theory,93 a plaintiff
may receive full recovery where there has been a judgement against one or
multiple defendants in a lawsuit involving several defendants.94 In applying
this theory of liability to foodborne illness litigation, anyone in the chain of
distribution and production of the contaminated food product could be held
liable for the entire amount of damages caused to unsuspecting consumers.95
Therefore, under joint and several liability, a defendant may end up paying
more than his portion of actual fault.96 Because of this concept, distributors,
grocers, or restaurants may contract with farmers to allocate certain liability
to the growers of the food in the event products cause foodborne illness.97
Contributory negligence is another form of liability raised in outbreak
cases where the defense asserts that the plaintiff is partially to blame for his
injuries.98 This is a defense usually raised in strict liability claims.99 Where
an injured plaintiff knew or should have known of the risk of consuming the
88. See Marks, supra note 13, at 758–59.
89. See Holt, supra note 7, at 108–09.
90. See id. at 109–10.
91. See id.
92. See id.
93. See Joint and Several Liability, CORNELL L. SCHOOL: LEGAL INFO. INST.,
https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/joint_and_several_liability (last visited Jan.
12, 2020).
94. AMERICAN LAW OF PRODUCTS LIABILITY 3D, supra note 73, § 52:1.
95. See Joint and Several Liability, supra note 93.
96. See id.
97. See Determining Legal Responsibility for Foodborne Illness & Injury, supra
note 82.
98. See Contributory Negligence, CORNELL L. SCHOOL: LEGAL INFO. INST., https://
www.law.cornell.edu/wex/contributory_negligence (last visited Jan. 12, 2020);
see also Determining Legal Responsibility for Foodborne Illness & Injury,
supra note 82.
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food product which was, at the time, known to be risky, then contributory
negligence may come into effect and the plaintiff would only be able to re-
cover partial damages.100 However, asserting the defense of negligence on
the part of the consumer is not permitted where the consumer simply failed to
discover the product defect or take precautions against a product defect of
which he was not aware.101
Lastly, alternative liability has been controversially introduced in a
handful of foodborne illness cases.102 Under this theory of liability, the con-
duct of two or more defendants is tortious, and the harm brought to the plain-
tiff is caused by one of them, “but there is uncertainty as to which one has
caused it, the burden is upon each such actor to prove that he has not caused
the harm.”103 It is necessary for the plaintiff to establish that all defendants
being sued were actually negligent in some respect and that they should carry
the burden of proof in refuting their guilt, because they are in a better posi-
tion to identify the party responsible for the damage.104 Practically, this form
of liability requires there to be a small number of defendants, so the plaintiff
can accurately and efficiently identify the offending parties responsible for
his harm.105
Under the theory of alternative liability, the burden of proof is on the
plaintiff to show that “of two or more actors, each has acted tortiously, and
that the plaintiff has sustained harm resulting from the conduct of some one
of them.”106 When the burden is shifted to the defendants, the defendants are
presented the opportunity to prove they are not the source of contamination,
and if they failed to do so, they may be held jointly and severally liable.107
However, the application of the alternative liability doctrine in foodborne
illnesses has not necessarily been successful, as some courts have refused to
apply the theory because plaintiffs were not able to meet their initial burden
of proof.108
99. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A cmt. n (AM. LAW INST. 1965).
100. See Determining Legal Responsibility for Foodborne Illness & Injury, supra
note 82.
101. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A cmt. n (AM. LAW INST. 1965).
102. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 433B cmt. a (AM. LAW INST. 1965);
see also Holt, supra note 7, at 112.
103. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 433B (AM. LAW INST. 1965); see also
Holt, supra note 7, at 112.
104. VICTOR E. SCHWARTZ ET AL., Multiparty Liability Theories—Alternative Lia-
bility, in GUIDE TO MULTISTATE LITIGATION § 2:14 (Supp. Nov. 2018).
105. See id.
106. See Holt, supra note 7, at 88.
107. See id.
108. See id. at 113–14.
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According to a study conducted by the USDA in 2001, only 31.4 per-
cent of plaintiffs prevail in foodborne illness lawsuits.109 The findings of the
study illustrated that the plaintiff’s ability to establish a causal link between
defective food and his illness was hindered by the identification of contami-
nated food product, the pathogen, and “the appropriate defen-
dant.”110Attorneys are more likely to take on foodborne illnesses cases if the
plaintiffs can be diagnosed with an identifiable pathogen, such as E. coli, and
the food product from which the pathogen was consumed can be identi-
fied.111 Even in alternative liability cases not dealing specifically with food-
borne illnesses, courts have rejected the application of the theory because not
all tortfeasors responsible for the harm inflicted were identified in court.112
Without a clear way to identify the source of contamination in a food-
borne illness outbreak, such litigation presents an uphill challenge that erro-
neously deprives victims of a legal remedy. Despite the lack of liability
theory consensus across jurisdictions in foodborne illness outbreak cases,
there is the common theme of a plaintiff needing to be able to identify with
some certainty the source of his injury.113 For these reasons, transparency in
food production is vital to effective judicial remedies for individuals who fall
prey to infectious food products.
III. BLOCKCHAIN: A PROMISING TECHNOLOGICAL
ADVANCEMENT SURROUNDED BY LEGAL
AMBIGUITY
In blockchain, there is not necessarily an infrastructure for confirming
the validity of the data entered, so what are the legal implications of an inves-
tigation into a widespread foodborne illness outbreak based on information
that may or may not be accurate?114 The legal issues surrounding blockchain
include the lack of government regulation concerning blockchain transac-
109. See id. at 108.
110. See id. at 108.
111. See Marks, supra note 13, at 733–36, 754.
112. See SCHWARTZ ET AL., supra note 104, at n.214 (citing multiple cases illustrat-
ing courts’ refusal to apply alternative liability because of lack of defendants);
see also Ryan v. Eli Lilly & Co., 514 F. Supp. 1004, 1017 (D.S.C. 1981) (re-
fusing to apply alternative liability where a plaintiff only joined seven of the
118 potential defendants in the lawsuit).
113. See generally Marks, supra note 13, at 754.
114. See Weizhi Meng et al., When Intrusion Detection Meets Blockchain Technol-
ogy: A Review, 6 INST. ELECTRICAL & ELECTRONICS ENG’GS 10179, 10183
(2018), http://orbit.dtu.dk/files/145448886/08274922.pdf; see also Zhuling
Chen, How Should We Regulate Blockchain? It Depends on Which Country
You Ask, FORTUNE (June 25, 2018), http://fortune.com/2018/06/25/blockchain-
cryptocurrency-technology-regulation-bitcoin-ethereum/.
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tions, the question of contractual certainty guaranteeing the validity of the
information entered, and a need for privacy safeguards.115
A. What is Blockchain and How Does it Work?
Blockchain is a form of technology that keeps ongoing records of trans-
actions, and the records illustrate how the organization using the technology
works internally as well as in its outside relationships.116 The concept of
blockchain was introduced in October 2008 as the underlying technology for
the virtual currency Bitcoin.117 Blockchain presented a way to avoid regula-
tory supervision, transferring ownership of a product, and efficiently con-
firming transactions.118 Generally, blockchain is a database across a network
where individual records combine to make a chain that is difficult to alter.119
A blockchain database consists of a “record” (any information such as a
transaction), the “block” (the bundle of records), and the “chain” (“all the
blocks linked together”).120
The process in a blockchain begins where a transaction is recorded, and
the record includes all the details of the interaction “including a digital signa-
ture from each party.”121 Then, the record is verified by the network of com-
puters on that database called “nodes.”122 After the record is verified, they are
added to a block.123 Each block contains “hash,” which is a unique code, and
the blocks will also contain the hash of the last block added to the chain.124
Next, the block is added to the chain, and the hash codes are used to connect
the blocks in a particular order.125 It is very difficult to change the block that
has been added to the chain, because the hash is derived from a mathematical
function that takes the transactional information and creates a unique alpha-
numeric identifier for the information.126 All of the codes generated by the
hash are the same length regardless of the amount of information recorded.127
115. See generally Chen, supra note 114.
116. See Marco Iansiti & Karim R. Lakhani, The Truth About Blockchain, HARV.
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The difficulty in altering the record comes from the fact that making any
change to the original input would create a new hash.128 Changing the origi-
nal information would break the chain because the next block in the chain
would still possess the original hash; thus, to keep the chain intact, a hacker
would have to recalculate the hash for every block in the chain.129
Another significant aspect of blockchain is that the database has no cen-
tralized third-party supervising the data being entered into the chain.130 In
contrast, a centralized network would have one computer on the network that
had the authority to verify transactions, but in a decentralized network, such
as blockchain, any computer can access the information and may get in line
to add transactional information to the chain.131
B. The Lack of Uniformity in Regulating Blockchain Technology
Because blockchain is a new and evolving form of technology, there has
been an ongoing struggle to determine the most appropriate way to regulate
and integrate blockchain programming into major forms of business.132 Cur-
rently, a comprehensive regulatory response to blockchain does not exist.133
Overall, there are three primary types of regulatory blockchain treat-
ment: (1) study-and-wait-and-see; (2) new legislation and regulation; and (3)
guidance and sandboxing.134 “The study-and-wait-and-see” regulators are
trying to “conceptualize and understand the potential foundational and trans-
formational implications of blockchains for economies and societies.”135 This
approach has both pros and cons; it is good because it avoids a premature
regulation that could hinder further technological development, but the ap-
proach provides no guidance for businesses to comply with law and avoid
conducting “‘unregulated’” business.136 The “new legislation and regulation”
is an approach based on enacting laws to control the use of blockchain, de-
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erable lack of standards for blockchain programming.137 Such an approach
presents the risk that as the technology continues to evolve, the laws will
become obsolete and require amendments or will excessively restrict the use
of the technology.138 The “guidance and sandboxing” position is where gov-
ernments have chosen to provide regulatory guidance of how new technolo-
gies fit into existing legal frameworks and to provide sandboxing
opportunities for new models.139 Sandboxing is a term referring to a safe
environment where blockchain developers have the opportunity to test their
products without fearing legal repercussion due to regulatory exemptions.140
The blockchain technology is then employed on a “controlled scale” for a set
period of time while under supervision.141
Internationally, the use and regulation of blockchain varies.142 The Euro-
pean Union (EU) has taken a firm stance on data privacy and implemented
strict regulations that have serious implication on blockchain applications in
any industrial use.143 On May 25, 2018, the EU passed the General Data
Protection Regulation (GDPR) which was intended to unify data privacy pro-
tections across the union, requiring that all citizens of the EU have the
“‘right to be forgotten’ online.”144 The purpose of GDPR is to establish that
EU citizens possess the right to own control of the use of their data.145 There-
fore, with respect to the transparency and privacy issues for blockchain appli-
cation, the companies employing blockchain will have to ensure that the
programming complies with the GDPR threshold for data ownership.146 In
contrast, East Asian countries have emphasized a pro-business perspective by
allowing blockchain programs to operate without oversight, deprioritizing the
issue of individual data privacy rights.147 South Korea stated that the use of
blockchain technology was encouraged outside of Bitcoin.148 Similarly, Ja-
pan was part of the initial efforts to make Bitcoin a standard currency by
issuing cryptocurrency exchange licenses to businesses.149 However, aside
137. See id.
138. See id.
139. See AKGIRAY, supra note 133.
140. See id.
141. See id.
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from the use of Bitcoin, Japan has not endorsed other forms of business using
blockchain based programing.150
The regulatory agencies of the United States have treated the use of
blockchain technology with tremendous skepticism.151 The U.S. Securities
and Exchange Commission deterred international cryptocurrency companies
from establishing roots domestically by requiring that cryptocurrencies be
considered assets under governmental purview.152 While there is no consen-
sus at the federal level on the use of cryptocurrency, the technological ad-
vancements offered by blockchain, which permit immutability and
decentralization to traditional exchanges, allows for the possibility of effi-
ciency and security of transactions.153 Further, several states have enacted
laws admitting blockchain ledgers as evidence and blockchain-based digital
signatures.154
Another concern expressed about blockchain is the fact that it is a de-
centralized network, which would require a greater amount of trust between
individuals entering information concerning the validity and accuracy of such
information.155 In certain blockchain applications, such as Bitcoin, users re-
main anonymous so there is no way to ascertain whether or not the informa-
tion they entered into this electronic ledger is actually correct.156 A potential
remedy to this issue is to create an application where the only individuals
permitted to enter information onto the database are known to each other,
such as a company and its employees.157 Another way to resolve the issue of
trust among users are “consensus models,” in which the blockchain sets tests
that computers must pass when attempting to add information to the
ledger.158 The consensus models would require the database users to
“‘prove’” themselves by showing the “‘work’ [they have done] by solving
an increasingly difficult computational puzzle.”159
With respect to data sharing and privacy, blockchain can be used as a
decentralized and distributed ledger in a series of person-to-person transac-
tions without the need for third-party supervision.160 This places some scru-
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information as well as the accuracy.161 Data sharing requires that collaborat-
ing parties have a sense of trust that neither will disclose the data shared in
the transaction.162 Further, there is a vital need for privacy concerning the
organization’s information, such as IP addresses, exchanged during a transac-
tion.163 However, blockchain technology can remedy data sharing’s issue of
balancing mutual trust and data privacy.164 With respect to the issue of mu-
tual trust, parties involved can sign a data sharing agreement, which can be
kept in a blockchain box and “would be public and unalterable.”165 There-
fore, no party could unilaterally act outside of the terms to which that the
opposing party has already consented.166
A solution to concerns regarding private information could be to share
“transformed data” as opposed to “raw data.”167 Raw data is any data that has
not been processed, either through computer software or manually; an exam-
ple would be the IP addresses involved in a transaction.168 In contrast, data
transformation is where information is converted from one format to another,
typically used in the process of converting documents into a different format
such as numerical sequencing.169 There are steps that can be taken through
use of blockchain technology that can resolve the security issues of data shar-
ing, and the implications for industry application.
IV. CURING AGRICULTURE’S LACK OF TRANSPARENCY
THROUGH BLOCKCHAIN
Blockchain technology presents an opportunity to be implemented in a
food production system so that consumers could check the history of any
product they purchase.170
161. See generally Mike Orcutt, How Secure Is Blockchain Really?, MIT TECH.
REV. (Apr. 25, 2018), https://www.technologyreview.com/s/610836/how-se
cure-is-blockchain-really/.
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A. Legislative Action Urges Food Safety Transparency
In January 2011, President Barack Obama signed into law the FDA
Food Safety Modernization Act (FSMA) which was designed to strengthen
the food safety system.171 The language of the act was crafted to give the
FDA more power to act preemptively rather than retroactively in preventing
foodborne illness outbreaks.172 Part of these preemptive powers is the ability
to require food production facilities comply with certain food safety mea-
sures.173 Facilities are required to meet five different criteria in food safety.174
First, the facilities must evaluate what food safety hazards specific to their
products could arise.175 Second, they must identify what steps will be taken
to minimize the hazards.176 Third, the facilities must monitor the controls
they have put in place to detect the possible risks.177 The facilities are then
required to keep consistent records of the monitoring and specify what ac-
tions it will take to address food safety problems that do arise.178 Further,
because of FSMA, the food facilities will be “required to keep documenting
implementation of their [preventative food safety] plans,” and the FDA will
have the right to access such records.179 As a result of these enhanced re-
quirements for documentation of food safety measures, there is a heavier
penalty against food production facilities for a lack of transparency.180
Blockchain presents an opportunity for food facilities to comply with
the new federal standards in a clear and efficient manner.181 The facilities can
interact with other counterparts in the food supply chain through a “permis-
sioned” network, so as to ensure the validity and accuracy of the information
being entered into the electronic ledger.182 Walmart began testing the IBM
171. Background on the FDA Food Safety Modernization Act (FSMA), FOOD &
DRUG ADMIN., https://www.fda.gov/Food/GuidanceRegulation/FSMA/ucm
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blockchain program in 2017 before implementing it in September 2018.183
The program brought such revolutionary efficiency to the traceability of
leafy greens that the Vice President of Food Safety for Walmart at the time,
Frank Yiannas, was able to identify specific points of information about
Walmart’s leafy greens within 2.2 seconds.184 This process previously took
nearly seven days to complete before the implementation of IBM’s
blockchain technology.185 The technology presents not only the opportunity
to identify the source of contamination but also prevents excessive food
waste by allowing for selective food recalls rather than a mass ban on a
product.186
On September 24, 2018, Walmart issued a letter to its leafy green sup-
pliers that starting in 2019, Walmart would be requiring the suppliers with
which it collaborates to use an IBM blockchain software in order to increase
produce traceability.187 The company was motivated to make this shift in
food production technology as a result of the spring 2018 romaine lettuce E.
coli outbreak, which resulted in ninety-six hospitalizations and five deaths
before the source of contamination was determined.188 Sam’s Club signed on
to the Walmart letter, explaining that the company would be requiring its
leafy green suppliers to utilize blockchain technology as well for the pur-
poses of auditing the chain of custody in food production.189 While Walmart
and Sam’s Club may be the first to implement the blockchain platform in the
United States, they are not the first companies to utilize blockchain as an
investigative tool in agribusiness.190
B. Agriculture and Blockchain Tested on an International Platform
In 2016, a British company, Provenance, developed its own blockchain
software to track tuna through Southeast Asian supply chains, so consumers
knew where the fish were caught and each time the fish changed hands
before making it to the consumer.191 Provenance created this technology to
183. See id.; see also Rooney, supra note 1.
184. See Unuvar, supra note 180.
185. See id.
186. See id.
187. See Letter from Charles Redfield, Exec. Vice President, Walmart U.S. Food, to
Walmart’s “Leafy Green Suppliers,” Food Traceability Initiative: Fresh Leafy
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allow consumers to know the origin of their fish and the kind of agricultural
practices being employed by the producers.192
The technology used by Provenance has been implicated as a tool that
could be used to trace not only a piece of meat or vegetable, but also every
material in a product.193 Provenance’s blockchain software has been used in
seven different case studies by other companies.194 For example, the Co-op-
erative (Co-op) in Manchester, England, used the blockchain technology to
track produce from its place of origin to the marketplace.195 The Co-op also
gathered data about the environmental and social impact of each business
that interacted with it on the blockchain.196 The Provenance software linked
together data from the farms, factory, Co-op depot, and retail branches,
building a digital history that could be accessed by Co-op and consumers.197
If a reliable infrastructure platform for block chaining could be implemented,
then not only would the proximate cause for foodborne illnesses be more
easily identified, but also allow consumers to choose to buy certain foods
based on the agricultural practices of the producer.
IBM, like Provenance, has taken an interest in the use of blockchain
technology to combat the issue of unethical labor practices in the food pro-
duction industry.198 Blockchain is IBM’s proposed solution to origin identifi-
cation in the coffee industry, because it can provide a method of verification
to identify whether or not the plantation from which the coffee came used
ethical labor practices.199 First, coffee beans may be traced by using a radio
frequency identification device (RFID) attached to the bags, which can be
scanned into the blockchain at any point in the supply chain from plantation
to retail distributor.200 A shortage of worker documentation in the coffee in-
dustry can lead to a lack of work contracts, forced labor, or low pay, but
blockchain provides some remedy by requiring workers to have a unique
192. See id.
193. See Blockchain: The Solution for Transparency in Product Supply Chains,
supra note 11 (explaining how blockchain for certification and chain-of-cus-
tody could be implemented in both production and manufacturing industries,
such as cotton growers and makers of fabric).
194. See Case Studies, PROVENANCE, https://www.provenance.org/case-studies (last
visited Feb. 17, 2020).
195. See Pioneering a New Standard for Trust in Food Retail, PROVENANCE, https://
www.provenance.org/case-studies/co-op (last visited Jan. 12, 2020).
196. See id.
197. See id.
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trust identifier on the blockchain.201 Then, workers can receive digitalized
payments in which the receipt “is automatically recorded to the blockchain
and payment confirmation is shared with organizations downstream.”202
IBM’s blockchain programming has been used to further replicate the
concept played out by Provenance in the Finland fish market.203 The S-
Group, a Finnish retail cooperative, has a beta blockchain program based off
of IBM’s that will allow customers to see the chain of production and retail
with respect to the origins of the fish they purchase.204 By applying the use of
blockchain, the S-Group wants to improve the customer experience by pro-
viding greater transparency that ensures quality as well as safety.205 Custom-
ers are able to trace a fish back to its place of origin by using the “QR Code
on the package of ‘Kotimaista-kuhafile’ fish, or by logging in to a tracking
website.”206 The blockchain allows mutual participation on the part of the
producers and retailers, and once the information is entered onto the chain, it
cannot be altered.207 S-Group’s technology is “based on modules of IBM
Food Trust,” which is “a collaborative solution built on IBM Blockchain
Platform and The Linux Foundation’s Hyperledger Fabric, created to effi-
ciently and securely trace food during each step of the food supply.”208
The IBM Food Trust has kept track of more than 350,000 food data
transactions, allowing consumers to select an entire meal from food tracked
exclusively through a blockchain network.209 Through the use of this
blockchain technology, people are able to see not only where their food
comes from for the sake of identifying their distributor preference, but also
identify more specifically possible sources of contamination. The IBM
blockchain technology aims to significantly reduce the amount of money be-
ing spent on issues related to foodborne illnesses.210
201. See id.
202. See id.
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C. Resolving the Weaknesses of Blockchain through Exclusivity and
Verifiability
It is also important to scrutinize what blockchain formats are being im-
plemented due to the inherent security and verification concerns.211 The
Walmart IBM blockchain program is on a limited scale; therefore, the only
users who would have access to the database are directly known and account-
able to Walmart.212 Further, on the Walmart blockchain, there would be
fewer additions to the data chain, which requires less energy to expend on
verifying information entered.213 The technology will be used to tell Walmart
stakeholders where, during which harvest, and on what farm a particular head
of lettuce came from.214 Whether or not the information on the system is
truthful will not technically be analyzed unless the information comes into
dispute, such as in the case of an E. coli outbreak.215
D. Blockchain Promotes Sustainable Agriculture Practices while
Ensuring Food Safety
The use of blockchain has further fed into the movement of “precision
agriculture.”216 Precision agriculture is the practice of ensuring that individ-
ual parcels of land receive the exact necessary amount of water, fertilizer,
and seed so resources don’t go to waste.217 However, this practice of agricul-
ture can be costly in that it requires intensive monitoring, making blockchain
technology a practical, cost effective solution.218 Blockchain can turn on au-
tomatic payments and keep history of exact amounts purchased.219 Further,
the technology can record the entire health cycle of fish and livestock.220 The
most relevant provision of the technology is that through blockchain, individ-
15-6-billion-annually/#.W1deXY8gnbVp (explaining that foodborne illnesses
cost the U.S. economy more than 15.6 billion dollars annually).
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uals can isolate diseases or contamination to particular barns, stalls, or
pens.221
Because a plaintiff will likely have consumed the food in the privacy of
his own home, a defendant is more likely to attack the witness’s credibility
by presenting quality control evidence from some point in the chain of food
production.222 However, there are courts that allow circumstantial evidence
of quality control on the part of the defendant to show that the food was not
contaminated, or unaltered, when it left the hands of the defendant.223 Admis-
sibility of whether a food production company was negligent in handling the
food will not be sufficient but may serve to show that the producer breached
an implied warranty to the consumer that the food product was fit for
consumption.224
E. Blockchain Technology Can Provide the Clarity to Judicial
Ambiguity
The use of blockchain allows for greater transparency in the food supply
chain which directly correlates with the recurring issue of defendant identifi-
cation in foodborne illness cases.225 To overcome the issue of the credibility
of the plaintiff’s testimony in the eyes of the jury and the court, the capability
to access a clear list of participants in the food chain is crucial in identifying
plausible defendants with more precision.
Equipped with a ledger of who interacted with the food, the threshold
necessary for strict liability to apply would be much more feasible to meet.226
Generally, for strict liability to apply, a plaintiff must show that the product
was defective at the time of purchase.227 Using blockchain, who specifically
handled the product, as well as who tested the product for the contaminant,
221. See id.
222. See generally Pulley v. Pac. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 68 Wash. 2d 778, 783
(1966); see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PROD. LIAB. § 7 (1998).
223. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PROD. LIAB. § 7 (1998) (citing Brown v.
Gen. Foods Corp., 573 P.2d 930, 934 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1978) (reasoning that
manufacturers are often limited to circumstantial evidence because of its avail-
ability and may be used to show the “improbability of defect as alleged by the
plaintiff”).
224. See Pulley, 68 Wash. 2d at 783 (explaining “the implied warranty as to the
wholesomeness of food . . . is based upon reasoning and public policy consider-
ations to the effect that manufacturers and retailers of food products have a
duty to consumers”).
225. See Holt, supra note 7, at 108–9.
226. See generally Determining Legal Responsibility for Foodborne Illness & In-
jury, supra note 82.
227. See id.
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can be identified.228 Even in non-strict liability cases, plaintiffs would be able
to more easily satisfy the requirements of the defendant’s breach of duty
being the cause in fact of the plaintiff’s harm and that the harm was within
the scope of liability.229 Therefore, the ability to know specific defendants
who handled the food products and be able to test for contamination through
blockchain would be invaluable to plaintiffs in foodborne illness litigation.
In terms of allocating damages, the concepts of joint and several liabil-
ity as well as alternative liability become less controversial with blockchain.
For joint and several liability, the defendants would have greater knowledge
than the plaintiff about the degree of fault each one held through using
blockchain.230 As demonstrated in the Provenance case studies, anyone with
access to the blockchain would be able to determine who handled the food
product and at what point in time.231 Alternative liability would be more fea-
sible because by knowing who in the blockchain was responsible at a certain
point in time for the product, there would be confirmation of a defendant’s
wrongdoing.232 The use of blockchain would serve dual purposes from a le-
gal perspective: (1) the shifting of the burden of proof from the plaintiff to
the defendant would not be so arduous; and (2) defendants would be able to
avoid paying more damages than their actual portion of fault.
With respect to the concept of contributory negligence, defendants may
be able to establish whether a plaintiff acted negligently in consuming the
contaminated food product more easily. If the food producer uses a technol-
ogy, like Provenance, that permits the customers themselves to view, but not
necessarily alter, the food supply chain, then there could be an argument that
the plaintiff was warned of a possible danger.233 The ability to lower the
amount of damages owed would encourage food production companies to
invest in technology for transparency with consumers and deter consumers
from bringing frivolous lawsuits.234
The security concerns about the lack of a centralized network that has
the authority to verify transactions is a non-issue in the application of
blockchain to food safety transparency.235 By applying the technology to an
exclusive network of producers who are relatively known to each other, there
is not only an ability to individually verify the information, but also a smaller
228. See id.
229. See Marks, supra note 13, at 757.
230. See Holt, supra note 7, at 112; see also Joint and Several Liability, supra note
93.
231. See Case Studies, supra note 194; see also Pioneering a New Standard, supra
note 195.
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pool of defendants to pursue legal remedy against.236 Walmart has sought to
preemptively remedy one of the possible legal pitfalls of blockchain by limit-
ing the use of IBM blockchain software exclusively to leafy green producers
who work consistently with Walmart.237 By limiting the number of users spe-
cifically to users with an established relationship with Walmart, the company
is attempting to ensure the validity of the information entered in to the elec-
tronic ledger.238 Within the realm of agriculture, the ability to limit a network
to a number of verifiable individuals not only promotes food safety trans-
parency, but also sustainable work practices by producers of food.239
Using blockchain technology, a judicial consensus on a legal theory to
apply to foodborne litigation could be formed, which would limit forum
shopping that may have been encouraged by the various standards of liability
applied to defendants in such cases. Blockchain presents an opportunity to
satisfy one of the most crucial elements of a lawsuit: identifying a defendant.
V. BLOCKCHAIN TECHNOLOGY IS THE SOLUTION TO LACK
OF FOOD SAFETY TRANSPARENCY AND LEGAL
AMBIGUITY
Technology appears to have finally caught up with the massive corpo-
rate food industry. Through blockchain, there is now a way to remedy a sig-
nificant blind spot which has hindered our justice system from being able to
hold offending parties accountable. Multiple companies, such as Provenance
and Walmart, have taken the steps to not only to ensure the quality manage-
ment of their food products but also prevent foodborne illness pandemics.240
While there are still international discussions going on about how to
handle the regulation and application of blockchain technology itself, the use
of the technology in an agricultural setting appears to be effectively manage-
able.241 IBM has succeeded in developing a blockchain program that has ei-
ther been applied or replicated by multiple food product-based companies.242
The concern about confirming the validity of the information entered into the
electronic ledger could be remedied by the implementation of the technology
in exclusive environments.243
236. See Rooney, supra note 1.
237. See id.
238. See id.
239. See generally Widdifield, supra note 198.
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Under the FSMA, there is a clear legislative push for food product
safety transparency.244 An inability to quickly and accurately identify the
source of food contamination presents a considerable threat to the national
public, and the legislative branch of government is urging for a change.245
The CDC has a clear strategy for addressing the issue of foodborne illness.246
However, the CDC’s strategy is heavily dependent upon local governments
having their own foodborne illness detection programs in place in a way that
encourages the testing of allegedly contaminated food products.247 Testing a
food product may be moot if the source of contamination cannot be ascer-
tained in a timely manner, which may discourage local governments from
implementing programs that promote testing for foodborne pathogens. If the
application of blockchain based programs became a statutory requirement of
food product corporations, there could be a significant increase in testing and
terminating foodborne illness outbreaks before they reach a pandemic level.
A technology that was initially only considered as a vehicle for
cryptocurrency now presents a revolutionary opportunity to ensure food
safety on a national platform.248 By utilizing a program that tracks not only
information pertaining to the handling of the product, but also who is enter-
ing said information, there is a way to trace a prolific pathogen and provide
an elusive element in foodborne illness litigation. The United States should
be motivated to implement blockchain as a statutory requirement in agricul-
tural production rather than to be apprehensive about the regulation of this
technology. Blockchain has the potential to remedy the daunting issue of
foodborne illness origin identification, and companies in other countries, as
well U.S. companies, have begun to implement this technology in beneficial
ways.249
The case studies done abroad and IBM’s leaps in blockchain application
indicate a need for a uniform and sustainable form of record keeping.250
Blockchain is the next logical step in safety standard requirements. Further,
by viewing the application of blockchain to agriculture, the government
could even learn how to apply the technology to other industries in a man-
ageable manner.
The legally compelling need for plaintiffs to be able to identify the
source of contamination in a foodborne illness outbreak is essential in ena-
bling people to have a legal remedy for the damages incurred. Using
244. See Background on the FDA Food Safety Modernization Act (FSMA), supra
note 171.
245. See generally id.
246. See Investigating Outbreaks, supra note 34.
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blockchain could limit erroneous rulings for damages in litigation and instills
a greater sense of security in people with respect to the quality assurance of
their food. The security concerns related to blockchain do not outweigh the
considerable benefits to be gained by the public through its implementation
in the agriculture industry. Blockchain technology will allow parties on both
sides of foodborne illness lawsuits to receive a more accurate form of justice.
